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NOTES
CONSTSTUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THi PREss-DOES CENSOR-
SHIP OF MOTION PiCrTIts VIOLATE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS?-One
of the so-called "four freedoms" is freedom of the press. This is
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution. However,
what is protected by the guaranty has, in the recent history of our
country, become a point of contention. Ever since the first local
censor armed with scissors or injunction attempted to cut or pro-
hibit entirely the showing of a motion picture, the question has been
asked, "Does the motion picture come within the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press?" Certainly the founding fathers
did not anticipate this question, so to fully understand the problem
it is necessary to proceed at least in part by analogy. Therefore,
it will be enlightening to look briefly at the history of the stage to
better comprehend the status of its cousin, the motion picture.
Historically, censorship of the visual dramatic medium by the
state may be traced back to England when, in 1737, an act was
passed providing that no one should perform or cause to be per-
formed any plays in places where he had no legal residence or with-
out a license from the Lord Chamberlain.' Thus, as the Lord Cham-
berlain was an agent of the state, this act established state censor-
ship over the theater. In passing, it is worthy of note that the play
and the players were licensed, and not the theater.2 This is anal-
ogous to the practice with respect to the motion picture today
though, as will be seen shortly, it was not always generally the case
in the United States.
When the early settlers crossed the Atlantic to settle in the New
World, they, as might be expected, brought many Victorian atti-
tudes toward the theater with them.' The major point of differ-
ence was simply that in the Colonies the theater itself was licensed,
not the play.
When motion pictures were first shown, they were ustially ex-
hibited in the licensed vaudeville theaters. Therefore, a natural
association arose in the minds of the people and the governmental
officials likening the new medium to the stage. In fact, in their in-
fancy movies were little more than photographed plays of ques-
tionable artistic merit. Considering this associaton of ideas, it is
1. Isaacs, Law* of Theatres, Music-Halls, Cinemas, etc. 2 (1927).
2. Ibid.
3. Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 'Yale L.J. 704 (1951).
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not difficult to see why the states applied restrictions in the form
of licensing and censorship to the cinematic medium, even as they
had before to the legitimate theater.
An early Ohio decision held that motion pictures were not a part
of the press under the First Amendment of the Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court in the Mutual Film case, in upholding
the Ohio court's decision permitting the censorship, said that the
motion picture "may be a medium of thought, but so are many
things. So is the theater, the circus, and all other shows and spec-
tacles. [Motion pictures are] mere representations of events, of
ideas and sentiments published and known, vivid useful and enter-
taining no doubt, but . . .capable of evil, having power for it,
the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibi-
tion" " The anlalogy to the stage in this decision is evident. Cen-
sorship of movies by states and cities was tightened as the industry
progressed. The statutes and ordinances censored on a multitude
of grounds. such as sacrilege, 5 obscenity,' and immorality. 7 One
court stated that the showing of a motion picture is a mere privi-
lege and is subject to police regulation.8 As a final "catch all", the
federal government has a statute which punishes the interstate
transportation of indecent films.9
It was not until 1948 that the Supreme Court took its present
stand on the position of the motion picture under the First
Amendment. In United States v. Paramount Pictures,10 the court
stated that the motion picture fell under the constitutional guaranty
of freedom of the press as set forth in the First Amendment. This
was diametrically opposed to the court's view in the Mutual Film
case referred to above.
1"
In a later case, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York which had sustained censorship on
the ground that a certain, film was sacrilegious,'1 2 stating, "Under
such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it
virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and
he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression
4. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commn. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
5. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E. 2d 665 (1951).
6. In re Fox Film Corp., 295 Pa. 461, 145 Atl. 514 (1929).
7. Foy Production v. Graves, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 573, 15 N.E. 2d 435 (1938).
8. Mutual Film Corp. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (7th Cir. 1915).
9. 42 Stat. 936 (1922), 18 U.S.C. §396 (1926). (Under federal law, at least, the
motion picture does not stand alone under the shadow -of 'regulatory acts, since the other
media of mass expression and communication are governed by this same statute.)
10. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
11. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commn., supra, note 4.
12. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religous minority." This was
the first case holding that motion pictures are guaranteed freedom
as a part of the press under the First Amendment and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion picture
involved was called "The Miracle" and dealt with the story of a
peasant girl who meets a stranger whom she addresses as "Saint
Joseph." "Saint Joseph" first causes her to become intoxicated, and
it is inferred that he later seduces her, with the result that she con-
ceives a child. He abandons her, a mock religious procession is
staged in her honor, she is thrown out by her former lover, and fi-
nally, with a graphic portrayal of her labor pains, the picture con-
cludes with the birth of her child in the courtyard of a church. She
addresses the baby as "my blessed son," "my holy son". This mo-
tion picture was produced in Italy by Roberto Rosselini. The
Catholic Cinematographic Centre, the Vatican's censorship agency,
declared that the picture "constitutes in effect an abominable
profanation from religious and moral viewpoints." On the other
hand, the critic for Il Popolo, speaking for the Christian Democratic
Party, the Catholic party, praised the picture as "a beautiful thing,
humanly felt, alive, true and without religious profanation .. "
When "The Miracle" was released in New York, it was promptly
attacked as "a sacrilegious and blasphemous mockery of Christian
religious truth" by the National Legion of Decency, a private Cath-
olic organization for film censorship. His Eminence, Francis Cardi-
nal Spellman, condemned the picture and called on "all right think-
ing citizens" to unite to tighten censorship laws; whereas, William
Clancy, a teacher at the University of Notre Dame, wrote in The
Commonweal, the Catholic weekly, that "the film is not obviously
blasphemous or obscene, either in its intention or execution." Allen
Tate, a Caholic poet and critic, wrote: "The picture seems to me
to be superior in acting and photography but inferior dramatical-
ly.. . In the long run what Cardinal Spellman will have succeeded
in doing is insulting the intelligence and faith of American Cath-
olics with the assumption that a second-rate motion picture could
in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith." I The
Supreme Court held that freedom of expression through the motion
picture was protected by the Fiist and Fourteenth Amendments,
but the Court cautioned that this protection did not imply "ab-
solute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at
13. Emerson & Haber, Political & Civil Rights in the United States, 704-706 (1952).
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all times and all places." It further pointed out that the rules gov-
erning motion pictures were not necessarily the same as those gov-
erning other media of expression. The Court reserved decision on
the question of whether a state may censor motion pictures under
a clearly drawn statute designed to prevent the showing of obscene
fiilms.1 4 It did say that freedom of expression does not permit the
censoring of a motion picture prior to release and distribution. 15
Shortly after this decision, the Supreme Court reversed, without
opinon, a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision which had sus-
tained a conviction for exhibiting a picture that had been denied
a license under an ordinance permitting a license to be withheld if
the censors were of the opinion that the film was "prejudical to the
best interest" of the local residents. 1 Justice Douglas, in a con-
curring opinion, stated, "If a board of censors can tell the American
people what it is in their best interest to see or to read or to hear,
then thought is regimented, authority substituted for liberty, and
the great purpose of the First Amendment to keep uncontrolled the
freedom of expression defeated." 17
More recently, two other state court decisions sustaining censor-
ship have been reversed by the Supreme Court. The Ohio Court
had upheld censorship on the ground that "the effect of the picture
on unstable persons of any age level could lead to a serious in-
crease in immorality and crime." "' New York had censored a pic-
ture because it was alleged to be "immoral" and "would tend to
corrupt morals." 10 The Supreme Court reversed this case, without
opinion, citing the "Miracle" case. In concurring opinions, Justices
Douglas and Black stated that all censorship of films is forbidden
under the First Amendment, and that it draws no distinction be-
tween the various methods of communication.
2 0
There seems to be a great difference of opinion as to the degree
of freedom the motion picture should have under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. There is a good argument in favor of
censorship in some cases, since motion pictures are not strictly com-
parable to other media of expression. For example, the newspaper
is important mainly in that it furnishes information to the public.
The motion picture, however, provides entertainment plus infor-
14. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 502 (1952).
15. Id. at 503 (alternative holding).
16. GeUing v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
17. Ibid.
18. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
19. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University, 346 U.S. 587, 863 (1984).
20. See Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, supra, note 18 at 588.'
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mnation to a much wider group, and due to its greater circulation
and pronounced graphic appeal it has greater influence on social
mores than the printed page.
However, intellectuals have constantly damned censorship. Jac-
ques Maritian, a French philosopher, showed his dislike for censor-
ship by the state by writing: "It is too much for the state for in-
stance, to judge whether a work of art is possessed of an intrinsic
quality of immorality. It is enough for it to judge whether an author
or publisher plans to make money in selling obscenities." 21
Frequently, the slings and arrows of outrageous censorship are
directed rather indiscriminately at a somewhat vague social con-
cept known as obscenity. It is well to remember in this connection,
the words of the eminent French artist, Toulouse-Lautrec, who sug-
gested that evil is only in the eye of the perceiver.
It is argued that motion picture censorship is essential because of
the number of indecent films which would otherwise be produced
and shown. The Breen Code, set up by the motion picture industry
itself, has been more than moderately successful in providing
self-imposed censorship. 2 Provisions included in the code prohibit,
for example, scenes of brutal killings, adultery and illicit sex, scenes
of passion, seduction and rape, and scenes of actual childbirth. Be-
fore a picture can be given the seal of the Motion Picture Producers
and Distributors' Association, both the shooting script and the re-
lease print must pass the scrutiny of the Breen Office. Of course the
Code is no more infallible than any other kind of legislation. There
are no provisions for enforcement of a breach of the Code and no
sanctions against the release of a motion picture without the seal.
In fact, the somewhat controversial "The Moon is Blue" was re-
leased sans seal. However, the overwhelming majority of pictures
ground out of the cameras pass the scrutiny of the Breen Office.
The Code is probably the soundest present means of censorship in
that it is of, by and for the motion picture producer. It is adminis-
tered by and with the cooperation of men who best know their own
medium and the problems connected therewith, and are probably
the best qualified to keep it within the realm of good taste.
Though it is no doubt academically correct that if a certain group
does not like a picture after it has been produced, it should restrain
21. Maritian, The Man & the State, 118 (1951).
22. Emerson & Haber, Political & Civil Rights in the United States, supra, note 13
at 715.
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itself from seeing it rather than imposing its idiosyncracies on others,
it is hard to put the ideal into practice.
Whether the group has the direct sanction of government on any
level, or is merely a social or religious pressure group, its members
will think, at least subconsciously, that their own particular dogma
and beliefs are correct not only for themselves, but for all society,
and will act accordingly. This has been unfortunately demonstrated
time and again.
Though there are certain constants in our society, many values
are still relative, and opinions and mores vary at least superficially
from group to group. Therefore, perhaps it would be best to look
to the method adopted by the English, namely that of the advisory
review board. In this country, regional review boards could be set
up to inform the people of the content of a particular motion pic-
ture without editorializing. In this way, the final adjudication of
the merits of the cinematic product could be made by the one most
closely affected in the final analysis: the movie-goer. Children
would be protected through the guidance of parents, who would
themselves be kept informed by means of the regional board of
review.
By some means such as this both governmental and pressure
group censorship might be eliminated. Both are objectionable on
the same principle. They attempt to give to the few the power to
decide what is best for the many. This is essentially totalitarian,
and diametrically contrary to our democratic principles of govern-
ment.
THALES L. SECREST
INSURANE-DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER LIABILITY PoLicy.-Nearly
every liability insurance policy contains a clause in which the in-
surer agrees to defend suits brought against the insured. Such de-
fense clauses are limited to suits for damages resulting from acts
or omissions of the insured which are covered by the policy. The
problem to be considered arises when the company refuses to de-
fend, claiming that the action is not one which is covered by. the
policy. This situation frequently presents itself when the allega-
tions in the complaint do not clearly establish whether the action
is within the coverage or outside the coverage of the policy.
This problem has been the subject of much legal controversy
